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The Long Road to Reformulating the Understanding of 
Directors’ Duties: Legalizing Team Production Theory? 
Thomas Clarke* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this Article, the historical evolution of corporate governance is 
considered, highlighting the different eras of governance, the dominant 
theoretical and practical paradigms, and the reformulation of paradigms 
and counter paradigms. Two alternative and sharply contrasting theoriza-
tions, one collective and collaborative (the work of Berle and Means), 
the other individualistic and contractual (agency theory and shareholder 
value) are focused upon. The explanatory potential of Blair and Stout’s 
team production theory is elaborated, along with its conception of the 
complexity of business enterprise, with a mediating hierarch (the board 
of directors) securing a balance between the interests of different stake-
holders. The potential for reform of corporate purpose, corporate govern-
ance, and directors’ duties is examined with reference to the U.K. Mod-
ern Company Law Review. The impact of the intensification of the fi-
nancialization of corporations is analyzed, with the increased emphasis 
upon short-termism. The origins of the global financial crisis in share-
holder value orientations are explored, as well as the continuing rever-
berations of the crisis. In light of the foregoing discussion, I argue it is 
imperative to advance sustainable enterprise, and elaborate on the critical 
changes this will necessitate in corporate purpose and directors’ duties. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND OF DIRECTORS’ 
DUTIES 
Corporate governance has evolved through a series of epoch-
making paradigmatic challenges. Bob Tricker, who pioneered the con-
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temporary research in corporate governance,1 has suggested that three 
distinct eras can be identified: 
• Nineteenth century: Entrepreneurship 
• Twentieth century: Management 
• Twenty-first century: Governance 
The nineteenth century was a time of great entrepreneurs advancing 
technologies and products, building businesses in enterprises they owned 
and controlled with a personal domination. As business enterprises in-
creased in scale and complexity, the need for more specialized manage-
ment and for enhanced sources of investment led to the separation of 
ownership and control, and boards of directors became more firmly es-
tablished in the twentieth century to pursue the best interests of the com-
pany and provide accountability for performance. In the twenty-first cen-
tury, the need for wider accountability and responsibility of business has 
become apparent with the realization of the profound environmental and 
social impact of corporations. In addition, there is the increasing influ-
ence of the rise of vast investment institutions, the beneficiaries of whom 
represent large sections of the community including superannuation, in-
surance and mutual funds, and the recognition that effective governance 
is required for the security of investments. 
Managers operating in a particular era typically see the world 
through one overarching paradigm, within which separate frames of ref-
erence, metaphors, and perspectives that they use stand in some coher-
ence to each other, but differ radically from those in use in preceding and 
succeeding eras. Using new frames of reference or seeing through the 
assumptions of different forms means that the managerial and organiza-
tional world not only looks different, it becomes different (sometimes 
presented as the social construction of reality).2 In any system that is eco-
logically interdependent, if you change any paradigmatic part then you 
change the whole. When there is sufficient change and fluidity in the sys-
tem then we can speak of a “paradigm shift”—the period when a shift 
occurs from one paradigm to the next new paradigm. In these circum-
stances uncertainty and ambiguity will apply. 
Paradigm shifts are more challenging today because the pace of so-
cial, economic, and technological change is more rapid, and the impact 
of business on the environment and society is more profound. Multiple 
technological breakthroughs, shortening product life cycles along global 	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value chains, and rapidly changing markets are accelerating the pace of 
paradigm shifts, while serious questions are being raised concerning the 
sustainability of business enterprise.3 
 
 
Figure 1: The Evolution of Corporate Governance 
The evolution of corporate governance is portrayed in Figure 1, 
which highlights the different eras of governance, the dominant theoreti-
cal and practical paradigms, and the reformulation of paradigms and 
counter-paradigms. The early decades of governance in the nineteenth 
century were spent wrestling with the implications of the limited liability 
corporation. In the 1930s, Berle and Means’s recognition of the paradigm 
shift from owner-entrepreneurs to modern corporations with professional 
managers and dispersed shareholders defined the parameters of debate 
for the next half century, culminating in the remarkable intellectual con-
tributions of John Kenneth Galbraith and Alfred Chandler on the nature 
of the new industrial state and the managerial revolution during the ex-
pansionary years of the post-war recovery. In the more troubled econom-
ic times during the closing decades of the twentieth century, the narrower 
focus of Jensen and Meckling on the principal–agency problem took hold 	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with a vice-like grip on the minds of economists, lawyers, policymakers, 
and sometimes self-interested business people. More recently a reform 
movement in corporate governance, initiated in the U.K. Cadbury Report 
and spread internationally by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), has continued, though defied by 
the spectacular corporate failures of Enron and WorldCom, and almost 
imploded in the recklessness of the global financial crisis. 
Throughout the last century there were always radical voices that 
offered a different critique: in different eras, socialist, progressive, com-
munitarian, and stakeholder ideas possessed resonance and an appeal to 
an alternative economic and political system. However the strongest in-
tellectual legacy of this rich historical development is undoubtedly a par-
ticularly lethal, stripped down interpretation of agency theory and share-
holder value. How the crudest of conceptions could capture such a heg-
emonic hold is a subject worthy of deep study in the sociology of 
knowledge. 
Another tributary of ideas has offered a more thoughtful interpreta-
tion of the corporate governance dilemma. Team production theory, ini-
tiated by Alchian and Demsetz, comprehends something of the collabora-
tive basis of business endeavor that was fundamental to earlier theorists. 
The reformulation of team production theory by Margaret Blair and Lynn 
Stout presents a recognizable and meaningful explanation of the purpose 
of the corporation and the duties of directors. However, it is likely that to 
meet the imminent challenge of social and environmental sustainability 
in a post-carbon economy, further rethinking of corporate purpose, cor-
porate governance, and directors’ duties will be essential. 
The search for coherent new paradigms is a vital task in corporate 
governance because it is a discipline 
• that has become identified almost solely with endless templates 
for compliance and regulation; 
• overwhelmed by the constrictions of agency theory;4 
• neglectful of diversity, creativity, and innovation; 
• unaware of the impact of corporate governance upon the inten-
sification of inequality;5 
• with a narrow focus on empirical studies of abstracted variables 
and bereft of attempts at holistic explanations of integrated and 
interrelated social and economic institutions and systems; and 	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49, 77 (2005). 
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• ill-equipped to deal with the urgent imperative for corporate 
governance to deliver sustainable enterprise.6 
III. BERLE AND MEANS AND THE COLLECTIVE NATURE OF THE 
CORPORATION 
Since the origins of contemporary capitalism, the wider purposes 
and interests of the corporation were recognized and valued. Berle and 
Means were the first to fully explore the structural and strategic implica-
tions of the separation of ownership and control.7 Berle wrote in the pref-
ace to The Modern Corporation and Private Property that “it was appar-
ent to any thoughtful observer that the American corporation had ceased 
to be a private business device and had become an institution.”8 In their 
monumental work, Berle and Means searched for a new conception of 
the corporation that embraced the wide constituency of corporate inter-
ests and responsibilities (a concern tragically abandoned by most con-
temporary financial economists): 
Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can stand 
against the paramount interest of the community. . . . It remains on-
ly for the claims of the community to be put forward with clarity 
and force. Rigid enforcement of property rights as a temporary pro-
tection against plundering by control would not stand in the way of 
the modification of these rights in the interests of other groups. 
When a convincing system for community obligations is worked out 
and is generally accepted, in that moment the passive property right 
of today must yield before the larger interests of society. Should 
corporate leaders, for example, set forth a program comprising fair 
wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their public and 
stabilization of business, all of which would divert a portion of the 
profits from the owners of passive property and would the commu-
nity generally accept such a scheme as a logical and human solution 
of industrial difficulties, the interests of passive property owners 
would have to give way. Courts would almost of necessity be forced 
to recognize the result, justifying it by whatever of the many legal 
theories they might choose. It is conceivable, indeed it is almost es-
sential if the corporate system is to survive, that the “control” of the 
great corporations should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, 
balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community 
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and assigning to each a portion of the income streams on the basis 
of public policy rather than private cupidity.9 
As Olivier Weinstein authoritatively sets out, the clear features of the 
new form of corporate enterprise advanced by Berle and Means, “under-
lying its capacity to serve as a support to the accumulation of capital and 
to an unprecedented concentration of material, human and financial re-
sources,”10 included three essential dimensions: 
• The separation between investors and the enterprise, the status 
of the corporation making the corporation an autonomous enti-
ty, involving the strict separation between the assets of the en-
terprise and the assets of the investors;11 
• Incorporation required governance rules legally separating 
business decisionmaking from the contribution of finance capi-
tal, and giving discretionary powers to directors and officers, 
recognizing their managerial rights to allocate corporate re-
sources;12 
• The freedom in a public corporation for shareholders to sell 
their stock with the development of capital markets. This signi-
fied a radical change in the relationship of the investors and the 
enterprise.13 
These dimensions are integral to the investment, operation, and devel-
opment of corporations, the workings of capital markets, and are the 
foundation on which Berle and Means built their theory of the implica-
tions of the separation of ownership and control. Integral to this theoriza-
tion is a realization that there is a distinction between the corporation as a 
legal entity and the firm as a real organization. The corporation is both a 
legal entity and a collective, economic set of activities that cannot be 
simply reduced to a series of contracts. It is this latter existence that gives 
the corporation an existence independent from the changing sharehold-
ers.14 This gives rise to the enduring question: In whose interests should 
the corporation be managed? 
Berle and Means could never have imagined that eighty years later 
corporations, managers, shareholders, and lawyers would remain mired 	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in the controversial issues raised by their ideals. And however under-
mined and marginalized the idealism of Berle and Means became in the 
work of financial economists in the later twentieth century (who reassert-
ed shareholder primacy with a purity and intensity not witnessed since 
the early nineteenth century origins of industrial capitalism), the reso-
nances of good sense of the original Berle and Means statement contin-
ued in the minds and actions of practical managers and corporations. 
An emerging collective conception of the corporation is conveyed 
in the early work of Berle and Means, who identified the collective na-
ture of the corporate entity, the importance of managing multidimension-
al relationships, and the increasing accountability of the corporate entity 
with profound obligations to the wider community. 15  Paradoxically, 
Berle and Means left an ambiguous legacy16 that was subsequently inter-
preted in two alternative and sharply contrasting theorizations: one col-
lective and collaborative, the other individualistic and contractual.17  
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the large modern enter-
prise was represented as a social institution, an organization formed 
through collective action and technological advance.18 Chandler is identi-
fied with the conception of the large corporation as an integrated, uni-
fied, collective entity that could not possibly be reduced to the sum of 
individuals it comprises.19 Then, in the later decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, the view of the enterprise as a simple contractual arrangement—a 
nexus of contracts—and a mode of interaction between individuals be-
came ascendant, providing the theoretical framework for the ultimately 
hegemonic agency theory and its insistence on shareholder primacy and 
shareholder value.20 
The modern corporation, as typified by Berle and Means, manifest-
ed the separation of ownership and control, where professional managers 
were able to determine the direction of the enterprise and shareholders 
had “surrendered a set of definite rights for a set of indefinite expecta-	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 17. See Weinstein, supra note 4. 
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Behavior, Agency Costs and Capital Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Weinstein, supra note 4. 
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tions.”21 After the New Deal and the end of the Second World War, man-
agers seized the opportunities newly open to them, and many U.S. corpo-
rations grew massively in scale and market domination, achieving a 
preeminent position in the world economy. A new managerial mode of 
coordination of enterprise, technology, and planning had arrived trans-
cending the market.22 As Lynn Stout recounts: 
History suggests that Berle and Means’s 1932 prediction proved 
largely correct. For the next half-century, boards and executives of 
public corporations embraced a philosophy that has been called 
“managerial capitalism” or “managerialism.” Rather than seeing 
themselves as mere agents of shareholders, corporate directors and 
professional executives—who usually worked for fixed fees and 
owned relatively little stock in the company—viewed themselves as 
stewards or trustees charged with guiding a vital social and econom-
ic institution in the interests of a wide range of beneficiaries. Cer-
tainly they looked out for investors’ interests, but they looked out 
for the interests of employees, customers, and the nation as 
well . . . . Judged by that standard, managerial capitalism seemed to 
generate good results. American corporations dominated the global 
economy, producing innovative products for their consumers, se-
cure jobs for their employees, and corporate tax revenues for their 
government. And—especially notable—they produced outstanding 
investment results for public shareholders. Between 1933 and 1976 
(a period that includes the infamous bear market of 1973–1974), 
shareholders who invested in the S&P 500 enjoyed inflation-
adjusted compound average annual returns of 7.5%. This compares 
very favorably indeed with the sorts of returns shareholders have 
received more recently.23 
This was the era of Galbraith’s New Industrial State, in which cor-
porate growth and brand prestige appeared to displace profit maximiza-
tion as the goal of technocratic managers (who, in his view, often pos-
sessed excessively concentrated power).24 In a technocratic milieu, the 
shareholder was rendered “passive and functionless, remarkable only in 	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 22. See CHANDLER, supra note 18. 
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his capacity to share without effort or appreciable risk, the gains from 
growth by which the technostructure measures its success.”25 This Gal-
braithian idyll was disintegrating by the time of the severe recession of 
the early 1970s, with the inability of U.S. corporations to compete effec-
tively with Japanese and European products in important consumer mar-
ket sectors, accompanied by a push from Wall Street towards conglom-
erate formation in the interests of managing multiple businesses by fi-
nancial performance. “Over time purely financial interests have increas-
ingly asserted their influence over hybridised giant corporations.”26 
IV. THE GRIM HEGEMONY OF AGENCY THEORY AND SHAREHOLDER 
VALUE 
While the nexus of contracts theory preceded agency theory, and 
was the intellectual foundation upon which it was based, it was the crud-
er aspects of agency theory that became the dominant paradigm in busi-
ness and law. The insistence on the collective and public nature of the 
new corporations which Berle and Means convincingly made, and others 
including Galbraith and Chandler developed, invited a response from 
economists and lawyers who retained a belief in private property, free 
markets, and shareholder rights. This was a determined and successful 
effort to impose “the reprivatisation of the corporation.”27 
A fertile scene was set for Michael Jensen, his colleagues in the 
business and law schools at Harvard, and the Chicago school of econom-
ics—as enthusiastic advocates of the financialization sweeping through 
corporate America—to develop a finance-based theory of corporate gov-
ernance that was to envelop Anglo-American policy and practice. While 
agency theory and shareholder value were the most enduring principles 
of the Jensen legacy, they were preceded and accompanied by other fi-
nancial innovations that disrupted the stability and often damaged the 
substance of corporate America. The series of wrecking balls of lever-
aged buyouts (LBOs), junk bonds, and free cash flow directed at U.S. 
corporations were impelled by the frequent enthusiastic exhortations of 
Jensen.28 
Jensen was an early convert to the LBO, in which a group of inves-
tors and incumbent senior management would take a company private by 
going deeply into debt: “The discipline of debt and the potential vast re-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 25. GALBRAITH, supra note 18, at 356. 
 26. HENWOOD, supra note 24, at 262. 
 27. See Ireland, supra note 5; Weinstein, supra note 4. 
 28. See HENWOOD, supra note 24; William Lazonick, Controlling the Market for Corporate 
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wards from holding the stock would inspire managers to heroic feats of 
accumulation.”29 In this new market for corporate control, alternative 
managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources.30 
However, it is clear that the resources the new management teams were 
particularly focused upon were the cash flows of the corporations con-
cerned. Jensen neatly translated this investor avariciousness into “dis-
gorging free cash flow,” which he defined as: 
[C]ash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have 
net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital. 
Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over pay-
out policies are especially severe when the organization generates 
substantial cash flow. The problem is how to motivate managers to 
disgorge the cash rather than investing at below the cost of capital 
or wasting it on organization inefficiencies.31 
Yet, as Henwood persuasively argues: 
Jensen’s definition sounds more precise than it really is, while cash 
flow and cost of capital are possible to figure out, though different 
analysts will come up with different measures for each, it is judging 
future projects that is difficult. It assumes firms know how much 
money a project can earn. Of course they never can. In practice, one 
can do little more than extrapolate from the past, but that’s not real-
ly the same thing.32 
For Jensen, “the stock market is always axiomatically the ultimate 
arbiter of social good.”33 However, the result of eliminating the free cash 
flow of companies in LBOs (which disappeared in fees to investment 
banks and lawyers, and in huge incentives paid to management and for-
mer shareholders), and in loading up companies with debt, while facing 
increasing interest rates in the inflationary times of the 1970s and 1980s, 
was to leave U.S. companies without capital to invest in research and 
development at a time of increasing competition from overseas compa-
nies engaged in continuous product development.34 Meanwhile, Jensen 
was more impressed by the financial innovation of boutique LBO firms 
such as Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR), and the inventor of the low rat-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 29. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept–Oct. 1989, 
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 30. See Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. 
ECON. 5 (1983). 
 31. Jensen, supra note 29, at __. 
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ed/high-risk/high-return junk bonds, Drexel Burnham Lambert, suggest-
ing these financial engineers could readily replace corporate entrepre-
neurs: 
With all its vast increase in data, talent and technology, Wall Street 
can allocate capital among competing businesses and monitor and 
discipline management more effectively than the CEO and head-
quarters staff of the typical diversified company. KKR’s New York 
offices and Irwin Jacobs’ Minneapolis base are direct substitutes for 
corporate headquarters.35 
This amounted to the eclipse of the public corporation to Jensen, 
which he announced in a celebrated Harvard Business Review article, 
which received a robust response.36 Peter Róna, head of Schroder Bank 
in New York, maintained that by exclusively privileging shareholder in-
terests Jensen preempted “thoughtful analysis of the very question that is 
at the heart of the issue—what should be the rights and privileges of 
shareholders?”37 Róna questioned Jensen’s assumption that shareholders 
are better judges of capital projects than managers and corporate boards 
as “an ideologically inspired assertion that lacks empirical support.”38 
Extensive evidence assembled by Henwood suggests that Jensen’s 
confidence, that “all-knowing financial markets will guide real invest-
ment decisions towards their optimum, and with the proper set of incen-
tives, owner-managers will follow this guidance without reservation,”39 
was unfounded. The impact of the restructuring of assets in the increas-
ingly aggressive market for corporate control in the 1970s and 1980s was 
not primarily efficiency enhancing as Jensen maintained, and there is 
little support for the “inefficient management displacement hypothe-
sis.”40 While acquisitions may benefit some private interests, there is lit-
tle productivity gain and frequent losses from mergers.41 Any returns 
from hostile acquisitions came from other sources, including reductions 
in employment, tax savings, cuts in investment, and possibly, with mer-
gers within industries, increasing their market power to control prices. 
Moreover, management buyouts and hostile takeovers were not a new 
permanent organizational form, but a temporary reallocation of assets 	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 37. Peter Róna, Letter in Response to Jensen, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1989, at 6. 
 38. Id. 
 39. HENWOOD, supra note 24, at 276. 
 40. See David J. Ravenscraft & Frederic M. Scherer, The Profitability of Mergers, 7 INT’L J. 
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before they were transferred back to large public corporations.42 In this 
process the large U.S. corporation was not eclipsed, but was usually bad-
ly bruised and often left eviscerated. 
The 1980s ended with disillusionment in the role of LBO firms to 
serve any interest other than their own,43 with an extensive series of de-
faults by overleveraged firms amounting to the largest insolvency boom 
since the 1930s, and with the imprisonment of Michael Milken of Drexel 
Burnham for fraud. Those who wished to discipline corporations needed 
to find a more pliable tool than the market for corporate control in order 
to do so. The organization of shareholder activism provided a new form 
of investor assertiveness. Ironically, among the most influential of the 
new shareholder activists was T. Boone Pickens, an oil industry corpo-
rate raider. He organized the United Shareholders Association (USA): 
From its 1986 founding to its 1993 dissolution, USA tracked the 
performance of large public corporations and compiled a Target 50 
list of losers. The USA would try to negotiate with the underper-
formers, urging them to slim down, undo anti-takeover provisions, 
and just deliver their shareholders more “value.” If satisfaction 
wasn’t forthcoming, USA would ask its 65,000 members to sponsor 
shareholder resolutions to change governance structures. USA-
inspired resolutions were often co-sponsored by groups like the Cal-
ifornia Public Employees Retirement System (Calpers), the College 
Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), and the New York City Employ-
ees Retirement System (Nycers).44 
In 1995, a new organization, Relational Investors, was founded to 
invest and act as a “catalyst for change” with similar backing from a 
number of large institutional investors. These were pension funds of pub-
lic sector workers, adopting an antimanagement rhetoric aimed at big 
business, though focusing on governance reforms, such as more inde-
pendent directors and linking executive pay to stock performance.45 Un-
fortunately, these performance improvements would often be achieved 
by downsizing and investment cutbacks, and heralded an increasing 
short-termism in the obsession with quarterly results. The rationale for 
these interventions was that higher share prices benefited society at large; 
however, the loss of growth and employment through reduced invest-	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Return to Corporate Specialization, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: 
MICROECONOMICS 1 (Martin N. Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1990). 
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ment involved considerable social costs, and the benefits in share price 
gains were distributed to a much narrower section of the community, 
with the extreme concentration of all forms of shareholdings, including 
pension funds investing in equities, since all forms of superannuation are 
themselves highly unequally distributed.46 
Management theory and practice for some decades has been over-
whelmed by this narrow and constricted view of the modern corporation 
distilled into agency theory. Agency theory is often assumed to be eter-
nal, universal, and unquestionable in its explanation of the essence of the 
nature of the corporation. In fact agency theory is of quite recent con-
struction, heavily focused on the Anglo-American business world, and is 
profoundly questionable. All of the sophistication, rich diversity, nuances 
and insights of management scholars, and the experience and wisdom of 
management practitioners have been displaced by the rigid simplicity of 
the assumptions of agency theory in recent decades. 47  This one-
dimensional management, with its self-validating hypotheses, as Marcu-
se warned, has populated the management journals and infused manage-
ment discourse.48 
Jensen and Meckling’s Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs and Capital Structure49 remains one of the most cited eco-
nomic articles of the last four decades. It sets out a new theory of the 
firm firmly triangulated between: (1) property rights, (2) agency, and (3) 
finance. The singular concern for agency theory is that the “agents” 
(managers) represent the interests of the “principals” (shareholders). The 
new theory of the firm aims to go beyond standard neoclassical theory’s 
distancing treatment of the firm as a “black box,” and offers a stringent 
alternative to the managerial theories of Galbraith, Chandler, and others, 
in which the objective of the managerial firm was determined to be max-
imization of growth or size, and fulfillment of a wide spectrum of eco-
nomic, technological, social, and political goals.50 
Agency theory has become “a cornerstone of . . . corporate govern-
ance.”51 While agency theory is often regarded not only as the dominant 
current interpretation, but also as an eternal and universal explanation, it 
is very much a product of the Anglo-American corporation and capital 
market. Rooted in finance and economics, it has somehow managed to 	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penetrate not only policy and practice, but also the essential understand-
ing of corporate law regarding directors’ duties. Not only does agency 
theory dangerously oversimplify the complexities of business relation-
ships and decisions, it damagingly demands a focus on a single objective. 
Agency theory asserts shareholder value as the ultimate corporate objec-
tive that managers are incentivized and impelled to pursue: “The crisis 
has shown that managers are often incapable of resisting pressure from 
shareholders. In their management decisions, the short-term market value 
counts more than the long-term health of the firm.”52 
The mythology of shareholder value has proved one of the most 
debilitating ideologies of modern times. The pursuit of shareholder value 
has damaged and shrunk corporations, distracted and weakened manag-
ers, diverted and undermined economies, and, most paradoxically, ne-
glected the long-term interests of shareholders.53 An unfortunate lacuna 
in corporate law was filled by the simplistic tenets of agency theory, 
which has promulgated enduring myths of shareholder primacy that have 
been misconstrued as authentic legal interpretations of directors’ duties, 
and often guided directors with increasingly narrow and damaging cor-
porate objectives. The tenets of shareholder value are portrayed as eter-
nal, universal, and unarguable when they are of recent origin, exclusive 
to Anglo-American regimes, and profoundly contentious.54 
Among the central defects of agency theory as presently interpreted 
are: 
• Agency theory focuses on an oversimplification of complex fi-
nancial and business reality. 
• Agency theory damagingly insists upon the single corporate ob-
jective of shareholder value. 
• Agency theory misconceives the motivations of managers. 
• Agency theory ignores the diversity of investment institutions 
and interests. 
• Agency theory debilitates managers and corporations, and ulti-
mately weakens economies. 	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• Agency achieves the opposite of its intended effect.55 
As Didlier Cossin, Professor of Finance at the International Institute 
for Management Development, Switzerland, has recently observed:  
Most financial models taught today rely on false mathematical as-
sumptions that create a sense of security even as failure approach-
es. . . . The list of flawed theories (including agency theory) . . . are 
all finance models based on over-simplifying complex choices. This 
pretence that mathematical models are the solution for human prob-
lems is dangerous and is not only at the core of finance theory but is 
also in the heads of many corporate and financial managers. Given 
the tremendous changes in financial systems, these theories must be 
scrutinised and then abandoned as models for the future.56 
Not only does agency theory dangerously oversimplify the com-
plexities of business relationships and decisions, but it also damagingly 
demands a focus on a single objective. Agency theory asserts shareholder 
value as the ultimate corporate objective that managers are incentivized 
and impelled to pursue: “The crisis has shown that managers are often 
incapable of resisting pressure from shareholders. In their management 
decisions, the short-term market value counts more than the long-term 
health of the firm.”57 
Agency theory, while claiming an interest in how companies are 
controlled, dares not to enter the “black box” of the firm itself and, from 
a distance, hopelessly misconceives the motivations of managers, reduc-
ing their complex existence to a dehumanized stimulus/response mecha-
nism: 
The idea that all managers are self-interested agents who do not 
bear the full financial effects of their decisions58 has provided an ex-
traordinary edifice around which three decades of agency research 
has been built, even though these assumptions are simplistic and 
lead to a reductionist view of business, that is, comprising two par-
ticipants—managers (agents) and shareholders (principals).59 
Agency theory tends to ignore the diversity of investment institu-
tions and interests, and their variety of objectives and beneficiaries. As 
Lazonick has argued, institutional investors are not monolithic, and dif-	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ferent types of institutional investors have different investment strategies 
and time horizons.60 Corporate governance becomes less of a concern if 
shareholding is a very transitory price-based transaction, and much share 
trading today is computer generated, with rapid activity generated by 
abstract formulas. While life insurance and pension funds do have longer 
term horizons, and often look to equity investments to offer durable and 
stable returns, the behavior of other market participants is often focused 
on the shorter term, and more interested in immediate fluctuations in 
stock prices than in the implications of corporate governance for the fu-
ture prospects of a company: 
Pension fund managers can generally take a longer-term perspective 
on the returns to their portfolios than can the mutual-fund managers. 
Nevertheless even the pension funds (or insurance companies) are 
loath to pass up the gains that, in a speculative financial era, can be 
made by taking quick capital gains, and their managers may feel 
under personal pressure to match the performance of more specula-
tive institutional investors. The more the institutional investors fo-
cus on the high returns to their financial portfolios needed to attract 
household savings and on the constant restructuring of their portfo-
lios to maximize yields, the more their goals represent the antithesis 
of financial commitment. Driven by the need to compete for the 
public’s savings by showing superior returns, portfolio managers 
who invest for the long term may find themselves looking for new 
jobs in the short term.61 
Lazonick asks: why did senior executives willingly diminish the fi-
nancial strength and resilience of major corporations in this reckless 
way? The answer: 
The ideology of maximizing shareholder value is an ideology 
through which corporate executives have been able to enrich them-
selves. The economists’ and corporate executives’ mantra from 
1980 until the 2007–2008 meltdown of shareholder value and the 
need to “disgorge . . . free cash flow”62 translated into executive op-
tion grants and stock buybacks, and resulted in increasing dramati-
cally those executive options’ value.63 
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The power of the shareholder value model “has been ampliﬁed through 
its acceptance by a worldwide network of corporate intermediaries, in-
cluding international law ﬁrms, the big accounting ﬁrms, and the princi-
pal investment banks and consulting ﬁrms—a network whose rapidly 
expanding scale give it exceptional inﬂuence in diffusing the . . . model 
of shareholder-centered corporate governance.”64 
V. THE STRENGTHS OF BLAIR AND STOUT’S TEAM PRODUCTION 
THEORY 
The concept of shareholder primacy, and the concomitant insistence 
that the only real purpose of the corporation is to deliver shareholder val-
ue, has become an almost universal principal of corporate governance 
and often goes unchallenged. This self-interested, tenacious, and simplis-
tic belief is corrosive of any effort to realize the deeper values companies 
are built upon, the wider purposes they serve, and the broader set of rela-
tionships they depend upon for their success.65 The obsessive emphasis 
on shareholder value is an ideology that is constricting and misleading in 
business enterprise, is intended to crowd out other relevant and viable 
strategies for business success, and serves narrow sectional interests. As 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout argue: 
The idea that shareholders alone are the raison d’être of the corpora-
tion has come to dominate contemporary discussion of corporate 
governance, both outside and (in many cases) inside the boardroom. 
Yet the “shareholder primacy” claim seems at odds with a variety of 
important characteristics of US corporate law. Despite the emphasis 
legal theorists have given shareholder primacy in recent years, cor-
porate law itself does not obligate directors to do what the share-
holders tell them to do. Nor does it compel the board to maximize 
share value. To the contrary, directors of public corporations enjoy 
a remarkable degree of freedom from shareholder command and 
control. Similarly, the law grants them wide discretion to consider 
the interests of other corporate participants in their decision-
making—even when this adversely affects the value of the stock-
holders’ shares.66 
Since the mid-1980s, a majority of states in the United States (but 
not in Delaware, the seat of incorporation of many major U.S. corpora-	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tions) amended their corporate law statutes to permit (but typically not to 
require) directors to take into account in decisionmaking the interests of 
other stakeholder constituencies and community interests beyond share-
holders. Approximately half of these constituency statutes (as they are 
called), grant the license only in the context of a hostile takeover or other 
corporate control transaction;67 indeed, the license has principally been 
invoked by directors in response to an unsolicited takeover bid. General-
ly, the statutes do not give nonshareholder stakeholders standing to take 
enforcement action against directors, and they make no provision for rep-
resentation in governance of nonshareholder interests.68 
Lynn Stout explains how the Chicago economists strongly influ-
enced the debate over shareholder primacy to the point where, in the 
1990s, most scholars and regulators accepted shareholder wealth maxi-
mization as the proper goal of corporate governance.69 Hansmann and 
Kraakman’s 2001 paper, The End of History for Corporate Law, marked 
the peak of this theory.70 Stout’s view is that this was the zenith of the 
shareholder primacy view, which is now “poised for decline.”71 She ex-
plains very clearly that furthering shareholder value is only one interpre-
tation of directors’ duties: “American law does not actually mandate 
shareholder primacy.”72 
Despite these developments, the primacy traditionally accorded to 
shareholder interests is most often justified on the basis that it is the 
means by which corporate law can most effectively secure aggregate so-
cial welfare. This view was perhaps most clearly and familiarly ex-
pressed by the economist Milton Friedman when he wrote: “[T]he social 
responsibility of business is to increase its profits.”73 Vogel discusses the 
continuing market constraints on managerial exercise of responsibility,74 
and Robe mounts a sustained challenge to Friedman’s polemic.75 How-	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ever, the question of whose interests should shape corporate operations 
and strategy has become contested under the corporate social responsibil-
ity movement. Is it, and should it be, the collective interest of sharehold-
ers exclusively or should it also include other interests and wider social 
claims in their own right? 
Lynn Stout argues that the debate is not a simple contest between 
shareholders and stakeholders, but that the idea of shareholder value as a 
stand-alone concept does not make any sense. Indeed, she comments that 
“a relentless focus on raising the share price of individual firms may be 
not only misguided but harmful to investors.”76 Further: 
If we stop to examine the reality of who “the shareholder” really 
is—not an abstract creature obsessed with the single goal of raising 
the share price of a single firm today, but real human beings with 
the capacity to think for the future and to make binding commit-
ments, with a wide range of investments and interests beyond the 
shares they happen to hold in any single firm, and with consciences 
that make most of them concerned, at least a bit, about the fates of 
others, future generations, and the planet.77 
She argues convincingly that each of the basic assumptions behind 
shareholder primacy are false, and that shareholders do not own the 
company: “Corporations own themselves, and enter contracts with 
shareholders exactly as they contract with debt holders, employees, and 
suppliers.”78 Once it is conceded that directors are allowed to pursue the 
success of the company in meeting all of its contractual relationships—
and that they are not required to simply maximize the value of the corpo-
ration’s shares—the question then becomes: What ultimate objectives 
should they pursue?79 If the answer to this question is the corporate ob-
jective is to pursue a long-run goal to satisfy wider corporate interests, it 
is difficult to implement this prescription without adopting a more ex-
plicitly stakeholder orientation in practice, as even Michael Jensen, the 
arch-priest of agency theory, has conceded: 
In order to maximize value, corporate managers must not only satis-
fy, but enlist the support of, all corporate stakeholders—customers, 
employees, managers, suppliers, and local communities. Top man-
agement plays a critical role in this function through its leadership 
and effectiveness in creating, projecting, and sustaining the compa-
ny’s strategic vision. . . . Enlightened value maximization uses 	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much of the structure of stakeholder theory but accepts maximiza-
tion of the long-run value of the firm as the criterion for making the 
requisite tradeoffs among its stakeholders.80 
In recent decades, many theories of corporate governance have de-
veloped that have attempted to complement or displace agency theory, 
including institutional theory, resource dependence theory, stewardship 
theory, and stakeholder theory. Each has enjoyed varying degrees of 
support at different times. However, one theorization of corporate gov-
ernance that, due to its origin in the nexus of contracts literature, has re-
ceived more attention from legal scholars but deserves more attention in 
the business schools, is the adaption of team production theory by Mar-
garet Blair and Lynn Stout.81 In this director primacy model, the firm is 
viewed as a team production, defined as a complex productive activity 
involving multiple parties where the resulting output is neither separable 
nor individually attributable. 
In adapting the nexus of contracts theory, Blair and Stout consider 
shareholders as only one of the parties that make a contribution to the 
firm, and effectively are not the only residual claimants of the firm.82 
Other groups, including employees, creditors, managers, and govern-
ment, make contributions to ensure the enterprise will succeed.83 The 
assets created are generally firm specific and, once committed to team 
production, cannot be withdrawn and sold elsewhere for their full value. 
Blair and Stout provide an expansive adaption of the original theoretical 
framework of Alchian and Demsetz (who themselves did not use the 
concept of “nexus of contract,” though it is closely associated with their 
work). For Blair and Stout, team production theory with the board of di-
rectors serving as a “mediating hierarchy” between the different interests 
provides a sound foundation for conceiving of the corporation in both 
law and practice: 	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Adapted from: M. Blair, Ownership and Control (1995) 
We believe, however, that our mediating hierarchy approach, which 
views public corporation law as a mechanism for filling in the gaps 
where team members have found explicit contracting difficult or 
impossible, is consistent with the “nexus of contracts” approach to 
understanding corporate law. The “nexus of contracts” view of the 
firm holds that relationships in the firm should be understood as an 
intertwined set of relationships between parties who agree to work 
with each other in pursuit of mutual benefit, even though not all the 
relationships that comprise a firm are necessarily spelled out in 
complete “contracts.” It might perhaps be more informative to think 
of corporations, and hierarchical governance structures within cor-
porations, as institutional substitutes for contracts, just as property 
rights are an institutional substitute and necessary precondition for 
contracts. Nevertheless, we locate the mediating hierarchy model of 
the public corporation within the nexus of contracts tradition be-
cause in the model, team members voluntarily choose to submit 
themselves to the hierarchy as an efficient arrangement that furthers 
their own self-interests.84 
 
Figure 2: Berle and Means Model of Ownership and Control 
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As Figure 2 demonstrates, Blair and Stout have reformulated the 
Alchian and Demsetz approach to a nexus of contracts around the wider 
stakeholder relationships that exist in the business enterprise. While 
agency theory and shareholder primacy focus simply on the nexus be-
tween shareholders (principals) and directors (agents), the Blair and 
Stout conception of team production theory recognizes the significance 
and contribution of all with an interest in the success of the company, 
including employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, and government.85 
At the center of this constellation of relationships and interests is the me-
diating hierarch—the board of directors—who negotiate effective out-
comes in pursuit of the business’s success. Compared to the stark and 
binary assumptions of agency theory, Blair and Stout’s team production 
theory conceives of much of the complexity of contemporary business 
activity, the expansiveness of corporate purpose, and the demands upon 
boards of directors and managers in securing performance: 
The team production approach, however, offers another and in 
many ways more intriguing explanation for the anomaly of open-
ended corporate purpose. In brief, it suggests that the appropriate 
normative goal for a board of directors is to build and protect the 
wealth-creating potential of the entire corporate team—“wealth” 
that is reflected not only in dividends and share appreciation for 
shareholders, but also in reduced risk for creditors, better health 
benefits for employees, promotional opportunities and perks for ex-
ecutives, better product support for customers, and good “corporate 
citizenship” in the community.86 
Blair and Stout have portrayed a convincing alternative view of the 
essentially collaborative basis of corporate wealth generation across an 
array of involved and skilled stakeholders.87 This understanding of the 
business enterprise resonates closely with the approach of European, and 
Asian business.88 Lester Thurow, the former Dean of MIT School of 
Management, placed these differences in the fundamental conception of 
business purpose at the heart of his analysis of the relative competitive 
performance of Anglo-American, European and Asian enterprise: 	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If the executives of profit maximizing firms are asked to state the 
order in which they serve various constituents, shareholders come 
first with customers and employees a distant second and third. Most 
managers will argue that the sole purpose of the company is to max-
imize shareholder wealth. If Japanese firms are asked the same 
question, the order of duty is reversed: employees first, customers 
second, and shareholders third. . . . In the United States, private re-
search and development falls in recession and rises in booms. In Eu-
rope and Japan, it does not. To an American firm, cutting R & D is 
a technique for manufacturing profits during a period of declining 
sales. The same spending patterns exist in investment and training. 
These different patterns are reflected in the respective accounting 
systems. In US accounting conventions, since R & D is expensed, 
cutting R & D leads to higher bottom-line profits immediately. In 
Japan, where R & D is capitalized, it does not. Thus the Japanese 
accounting system discourages short-term behavior, and the Ameri-
can system encourages it.89 
While in need of further elaboration, the idea of a participative en-
gagement of all stakeholders in a common productive effort is far closer 
to the perceived reality of business activity than the abstracted and rare-
fied academic speculation of the agency theorists. Indeed, the arrival of 
the new knowledge-based economy added a powerful boost to the early 
conceptions of the essentially social basis of industry. As Charles Handy 
highlighted: 
The old language of property and ownership no longer serves us in 
the modern world because it no longer describes what a company 
really is. The old language suggests the wrong priorities, lead to in-
appropriate policies and screens out new possibilities. The idea of a 
corporation as the property of the current holders of shares is con-
fusing because it does not make clear where power lies. As such, 
the notion is an affront to natural justice because it gives inadequate 
recognition to the people who work in the corporation, and who are, 
increasingly, its principal assets.90 
Ironically, during the 1990s explosion of the knowledge economy, 
the Anglo-Saxon shareholder-value-based approach to corporate govern-
ance became reinvigorated in the United States, United Kingdom, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, and other countries that adopted this model (though 
the original high tech companies of Silicon Valley would never have got-
ten started without venture capitalists and employee stock options that 	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often maintained majority ownership until the companies were well es-
tablished and ultimately became the servants of equity markets).91 The 
shareholder value model also began to have a strong influence in Euro-
pean and Asian economies, which formerly sustained more stakeholder 
or collective conceptions of corporate governance. In the context of 
global competition, international investment patterns, and the aggressive 
growth of international mergers and acquisitions, assuming the primary 
objective of releasing shareholder value often seemed the only sure way, 
not only for international business success, but, for corporate survival 
itself. 
However, the practical realities of running a business are far more 
complex than the exponents of the single metric of shareholder value 
could possibly imagine. To maintain the viability and innovation of busi-
nesses, managers are required to focus not only on their profit model (the 
entire focus of agency theory), but also upon developing the configura-
tion of their business network, structure, and processes; creating their 
products and production systems; and enhancing their services, channels, 
brands, and customer engagement.92 Peter Drucker banged on about the 
many challenges and performance measures of management, and was 
widely read and understood by practicing managers: 
Neither the quantity of output nor the “bottom line” is by itself an 
adequate measure of management and enterprise. Market standing, 
innovation, productivity, development of people, quality, financial 
results—are all crucial to an organisation’s performance and indeed 
to its survival. Non-profit institutions too need measurements in a 
number of areas specific to their mission. Just as a human being 
needs a diversity of measures to assess its health and performance, 
an organization needs a diversity of measures to assess its health 
and performance. Performance has to be built into the enterprise and 
its management; it has to be measured—or at least judged—and it 
has to be continuously improved.93 
Managers are used to having their performance measured across this ar-
ray of complex activities by hundreds of performance indicators and are 
required to maintain continuous improvement in almost all of these indi-
cators simultaneously if they are to compete effectively in the market. 
For agency theorists to reduce this complex and demanding existence of 	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professional managers to the single metric of shareholder value is at best 
naïve, and at worst distorting and destabilizing in the interpretation of 
business reality and orientation. 
As the mediating hierarch in Blair and Stout’s team production the-
ory, the board of directors has to negotiate not only the conformance 
functions of monitoring and accountability that the agency theorists are 
focused upon, but also the performance functions of providing strategic 
direction and a policy framework if the business is to succeed (Figure 3). 
If boards neglect the commitment and investment in strategic develop-
ment of the company, then paralysis and decline can quickly set in; 
though if aggressive strategy is pursued without a framework of monitor-
ing and accountability, then recklessness may take hold. In their insistent 
emphasis on the delivery of shareholder value, agency theorists’ emphat-
ic attention is upon value extraction, and they routinely neglect the pro-
cesses of value creation. 
Source: Hilmer, F. and Tricker, R.I. (1991) 
 
Figure 3: Framework for Board Duties and Activities 
VI. THE REFORM OF DIRECTORS’ DUTIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The shareholder value view upholds a property conception of the 
company.94 In its most extreme form, as developed by the Chicago 
school of law and economics, this theory claims the assets of the compa-
ny are the property of the shareholders, and managers and boards of di-
rectors are viewed as the agents of the shareholders with all of the diffi-
culties of enforcement associated with agency relationships. Though the 
shareholder value orientation is assumed to be an eternal belief, firmly 	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rooted in law with strong historical foundations, little of this is anything 
more than a recent ideological convenience. Shareholder value in its cur-
rent manifestation was a construct of financial economists in the 1980s, 
meant to deal with the lack of shareholder value orientation widely ap-
parent in U.S. industry at the time. 
Historically, American corporations have demonstrated a broad 
conception of the committed orientation towards a wide constituency of 
stakeholders necessary in order to build the enterprise. Over time, and 
with the increasing market power of large corporations, managements’ 
sense of accountability might have become overwhelmed by complacen-
cy and self-interest. However, to attempt to replace self-interested man-
agers with managers keenly focused entirely upon delivering value to 
shareholders is to replace one form of self-interest with another. Any 
broadening of the social obligations of the company was dangerous ac-
cording to the shareholder value school of thought: “Few trends could so 
thoroughly undermine the foundations of our free society as the ac-
ceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to 
make as much money for their stockholders as possible.”95 
The difficulty is whether, in trying to represent the interests of all 
stakeholders, company directors simply slip the leash of the one truly 
effective restraint that regulates their behavior—their relationship with 
shareholders. These views were expressed with vigor by liberal econo-
mists, and enjoyed the support of leading business leaders and senior 
politicians. More practically, such views reflected how U.S. and U.K. 
companies were driven from the 1980s–2000s, with an emphasis upon 
sustaining share price and dividend payments at all costs, and freely us-
ing merger and takeover activity to discipline managers who failed in 
their responsibility to enhance shareholder value. It was the economic 
instability and insecurity created by this approach that was criticised in 
the report by Porter.96 
Meanwhile, efforts were made to clarify the law on directors’ du-
ties. In 1979 the U.K. company legislation was amended to provide that 
the matters to which directors “are to have regard in the performance of 
their functions include the interests of the company’s employees in gen-
eral, as well as the interests of its members.”97 The duty is owed to “the 
company (and the company alone) and enforceable in the same way as 
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any other fiduciary duty owed to a company by its directors.”98 There 
was a widespread sense that U.K. company law was in need of reform: 
“[T]he state of directors’ duties at common law are often regarded as 
leading to directors having an undue focus on the short term and the nar-
row interests of members at the expense of what is in a broader and a 
longer term sense the best interests of the enterprise . . . .”99 
In the Anglo-American world, many have argued for clarification 
of the legal duties of company directors, and these issues were extensive-
ly considered for several years in the deliberations of the United King-
dom.100 Traditionally, commercial law in many European countries has 
supported a sense of the wider social and environmental obligations of 
companies, which continues despite a recent enthusiasm for the principle 
of shareholder value, as some large European companies for the first 
time seek the support of international investors. The United Kingdom has 
stood apart from Europe as an influential exponent of the Anglo-
American market-based approach to corporate governance with a focus 
on shareholder value. However, this ingrained orientation in British 
business has not been unchallenged. In the 1930s, John Maynard Keynes 
railed against the irresponsibility of transient stockholders: 
The divorce between ownership and the real responsibility of man-
agement is serious within a country when, as a result of joint-stock 
enterprise, ownership is broken up between innumerable individuals 
who buy their interest today and sell it tomorrow and lack altogether 
both knowledge and responsibility towards what they momentarily 
own.101 
George Goyder cites a remarkable passage highlighting the blindness of 
narrow interpretations of existing company law in Lord Justice Percy’s 
Riddell Lectures in 1944: 
Here is the most urgent challenge to political invention ever offered 
to the jurist and the statesman. The human association which in fact 
produces and distributes wealth, the association of workmen, man-
agers, technicians and directors, is not an association recognised by 
the law. The association which the law does recognise—the associa-	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tion of shareholders, creditors and directors—is incapable of pro-
duction and is not expected by the law to perform these functions.102 
 An initiative to develop a more expansive view of corporate pur-
pose and directors’ duties in the United Kingdom was launched by the 
Royal Society of Arts (RSA) in the Tomorrows’ Company Inquiry in 
1992 into the sources of sustainable business success. This involved 
twenty-five major international corporations headquartered in London, 
and determined that the essential basis of business performance was the 
measurement and management of relationships with all stakeholders in 
the inclusive company: 
The conventional wisdom in the UK is to define the purpose of 
business in terms that stress the importance of immediate financial 
performance and returns to shareholders and treat other participants 
merely as means to this end. Of course, a Board must continually at-
tend to its company’s financial performance and level of sharehold-
er return, but an exclusive concentration on any one stakeholder will 
not lead to sustainable competitive performance. It is therefore not 
necessarily in the best interests of shareholders themselves to be 
singled out in this way. We believe that sustainable success is avail-
able from the inclusive approach in which the company includes all 
its relationships in its definitions and measures of success.103 
In an effort to jettison the company law rhetoric formed in the nine-
teenth century, and to make the law more accessible, a U.K. Company 
Law Review (CLR) steering group was established in 1998 after the 
RSA Inquiry. The ensuing consultative document proposed for the first 
time that there should be a statutory statement of directors’ duties (pres-
ently the core components of those duties is found in case law), and 
made a significant step in the direction of endorsing fuller corporate so-
cial and environmental reporting: 
[C]urrent accounting and reporting fails to provide adequate trans-
parency of qualitative and forward looking information which is of 
vital importance in assessing performance and potential for share-
holders, investors, creditors and others. This is particularly so in the 
modern environment of technical change, and with the growing im-	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portance of “soft,” or intangible assets, brands, know-how and busi-
ness relationships. The full annual report must be effective in cover-
ing these, both as a stewardship report and as a medium of commu-
nication to wider markets and the public. . . . [W]e believe that the 
time has come to require larger companies . . . to provide an OFR 
[operating and financial review], which will cover the qualitative, or 
“soft”, or intangible, and forward looking information which the 
modern market and modern business decision making requires, 
converting the practice of the best run companies into a requirement 
for all.104 
In this more expansive context and interpretation of corporate pur-
pose, two approaches were considered to revising directors’ duties: 
• A pluralist approach under which directors’ duties would be re-
formulated to permit directors to further the interests of other 
stakeholders even if they were to the detriment of shareholders; 
and 
• An enlightened shareholder value approach allowing directors 
greater flexibility to take into account longer-term considera-
tions and interests of various stakeholders in advancing share-
holder value. 
In considering these approaches, the essential questions of what is the 
corporation, and what interests it should represent, are exposed to light. 
As Davies argues: 
The crucial question is what the statutory statement says about the 
interests which the directors should promote when exercising their 
discretionary powers. The common law mantra that the duties of di-
rectors are owed to the company has long obscured the answer to 
this question. Although that is a statement of the utmost importance 
when it comes to the enforcement of duties and their associated 
remedies, it tells one nothing about the answer to our question, 
whose interests should the directors promote? This is because the 
company, as an artificial person, can have no interests separate from 
the interests of those who are associated with it, whether as share-
holders, creditors, employers, suppliers, customers or in some other 
way. So, the crucial question is, when we refer to the company, to 
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the interests of which of those sets of natural persons are we refer-
ring?105 
The U.K. Modern Company Law Review asked: “What should be 
the legal rule with respect to directors’ duties?”106 Should company law: 
• Require directors and senior managers to act by reference to the 
interests of all stakeholders in the corporate enterprise, accord-
ing primacy to no particular interests including those of share-
holders (mandatory pluralism)? 
• Permit (but not require) directors and senior managers to act by 
reference to the interests of all stakeholders, according primacy 
to no particular interests including those of shareholders (dis-
cretionary pluralism)? 
The most radical of these models is the mandatory pluralist model, creat-
ing a multi-fiduciary duty requiring directors and managers to run the 
company in the interest of all those with a stake in its success; balancing 
the claims of shareholders, employees, suppliers, the community, and 
other stakeholders. The claims of each stakeholder are recognized as val-
uable in their own right and no priority is accorded shareholders in this 
adjustment; their interest may be sacrificed to that of other stakehold-
ers.107 The discretionary pluralist model would permit, but not require, 
directors to sacrifice shareholder interests to those of other stakeholders. 
Either of these models would formalize earlier managerialist practice that 
has been displaced by the current shareholder value culture. As a mem-
ber of the Corporate Law Review Steering Group, Davies defended the 
enlightened shareholder value view suggesting the pluralist approach 
produces a formula that is unenforceable, and paradoxically gives man-
agement more freedom of action than they previously enjoyed: 
As far as directors’ duties are concerned, this is the heart of the en-
lightened shareholder value approach. The aim is to make it clear 
that although shareholder interests are predominant (promotion of 
the success of the company for the benefit of its members), the 
promotion of shareholder interests does not require riding rough-	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shod over the interests of other groups upon whose activities the 
business of the company is dependent for its success. In fact, the 
promotion of the interests of the shareholders will normally require 
the interests of other groups of people to be fostered. The interests 
of non-shareholder groups thus need to be considered by the direc-
tors, but, of course, in this shareholder-centred approach, only to the 
extent that the protection of those other interests promotes the inter-
ests of the shareholders. The statutory formulation can be said to 
express the insight that the shareholders are not likely to do well out 
of a company whose workforce is constantly on strike, whose cus-
tomers don’t like its products and whose suppliers would rather deal 
with its competitors.108 
An Australian legal expert, Paul Redmond, offers a more nuanced 
critique of widening the scope of directors’ duties too greatly without 
first developing adequate measures of their performance: 
The pluralist or multifiduciary model rests on a social, not a proper-
ty, view of the corporation. It identifies the corporate purpose with 
maximising total constituency utility. This is an indeterminate out-
come measure which poses particular difficulties is translation into 
a legally enforceable duty. The indeterminacy of the criteria for de-
cision and performance measurement also points to a probable loss 
of accountability for directors since it offers broad scope to justify 
most decisions. It is difficult to resist the conclusion of the UK re-
view that either it confers a broad unpoliceable policy discretion on 
managers themselves or must give a broad jurisdiction to the courts. 
The model needs either practical rehabilitation or a superior perfor-
mance metric. It is not clear where either might be found.109 
However, John Parkinson, another member of the Corporate Law 
Review Steering Group, argued strongly for the viability of a pluralist 
conception that maintained a broader sense of corporate purpose, but 
sadly Parkinson died during the period the steering group was meeting.110 
The Review process and the subsequent Company Law Reform Bill at-
tempted to tread a fine legal line between a sense of “enlightened share-
holder value,” which was becoming best practice in many leading U.K. 	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and international companies, and more radical claims for company law to 
adopt a more “pluralist” sense of the ultimate objectives of the enterprise 
and the interests to be served. The reform attempted to manage this bal-
ancing act by suggesting that the pluralist objectives of maximizing 
company performance to the benefit of all stakeholders can best be 
served by professional directors pursuing commercial opportunities with-
in a framework of standards and accountability: 
The overall objective should be pluralist in the sense that companies 
should be run in a way which maximises overall competitiveness 
and wealth and welfare for all. But the means which company law 
deploys for achieving this objective must be to take account of the 
realities and dynamics which operate in practice in the running of 
commercial enterprise. It should not be done at the expense of turn-
ing company directors from business decisions makers into moral, 
political or economic arbiters, but by harnessing focused, compre-
hensive, competitive decision making within robust, objective pro-
fessional standards and flexible, but pertinent, accountability.111 
Yet it was clear there were profound inconsistencies and tensions in 
this practical inclusiveness in terms of the division of powers, which 
might lead to serious cracks when significant corporate decisions were 
made. The reform supports the ultimate power of shareholders to appoint 
or dismiss directors for whatever reasons they choose, and to intervene in 
management to the extent the constitution permits, and confesses: 
There is clearly an inconsistency between leaving these powers of 
shareholders intact and enabling or requiring directors to have re-
gard to wider interests. . . . The effect will be to make smaller trans-
actions within the powers of directors subject to the broad pluralist 
approach, but larger ones which are for shareholders subject only to 
the minimal constraints which apply to them.”112 
After much debate it was the discretionary pluralism model that emerged 
clearly in the U.K. Company Law Review Steering Group following its 
comprehensive review of company law, which recommended a recasting 
of directors’ duties to give effect to its notion of “enlightened sharehold-
er value” ultimately contained in the Companies Bill 2006, which re-
ceived Royal Assent on November 8, 2006. 
Section 172(1) of the UK Companies Act 2006 establishes a duty to 
pursue broadly the success of the company: 
172  Duty to promote the success of the company 	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(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in 
good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in do-
ing so have regard (amongst other matters) to— 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long 
term, 
(b) the interests of the company’s employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships 
with suppliers, customers and others, 
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the commu-
nity and the environment 
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputa-
tion for high standards of business conduct, and 
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the com-
pany.113 
Effectively, § 172 replaces the discretion of directors to attend to these 
issues, with a “duty . . . to . . . have regard (amongst other matters) 
to . . . .”114 For the conservative British business establishment this might 
have been a significant step, but to many business people in other parts 
of the world, this might represent little more than a statement of common 
sense. Yet, not only in the United Kingdom, but also in the United States, 
this controversial new clause was trumpeted as a remarkable innovation 
in company law, the U.K. government claiming the provision “marks a 
radical departure in articulating the connection between what is good for 
a company and what is good for society at large.”115 How the govern-
ment interpreted the new clause was elaborated in the 2005 White Paper: 
The basic goal for directors should be the success of the company 
for the benefit of its members as a whole; but that, to reach this 
goal, directors would need to take a properly balanced view of the 
implications of decisions over time and foster effective relationships 
with employees, customers and suppliers, and in the community 
more widely. The Government strongly agrees that this approach, 
which [is] called “enlightened shareholder value,” is most likely to 
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drive long-term company performance and maximise overall com-
petitiveness and wealth and welfare for all.116 
In light of the U.K. debate, other Anglo-American countries began 
considering reformulating directors’ duties. In Australia, the potential of 
changing corporate law and directors’ duties was considered at this time 
in two parliamentary inquiries by the Corporations and Markets Adviso-
ry Committee (CAMAC) and Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corpo-
rations and Financial Services (PJC). In Australia, the Corporations Act 
2001 does not provide an explicit legal duty that is owed by corporations 
and their directors to society, creditors, employees, company groups, and 
individual shareholders. In practice, however, it is accepted that the duty 
to act in the interests of the company may not be distinct from the inter-
ests of other stakeholders. This appreciation is leading to the develop-
ment of an “Environment, Social, and Governance” (ESG) theme in 
board management. 
In this context, both inquiries rejected the need to change company 
law and insisted that existing law permitted a wide definition of direc-
tors’ duties: 
[A] well-managed company will generally see it as being in its own 
commercial interests, in terms of enhancing corporate value or op-
portunity, or managing risks to its business, to asses and, where ap-
propriate, respond to the impact of its activities on the environmen-
tal and social context in which it operates. Companies that fail to do 
so appropriately may jeopardise their commercial future.117 
And: 
Companies that embrace the concept of corporate responsibility are 
realizing that the long-term financial interests of a company are not 
“mutually exclusive” with acting fairly in the interests of stakehold-
ers (other than shareholders).118 
While both reports concluded that corporate social responsibility, in 
addition to the social and environmental benefits, can be an important 
means for companies to manage nonfinancial risks and maximize their 
long-term financial value, they recommended the expansion of corporate 
voluntary initiatives rather than looking to any change in the law. Many 
in Australia regarded this refusal to change the law as a missed oppor-	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tunity, both to clarify the law and to propel the growing movement to-
wards greater corporate social and environmental responsibility. 
VII. HOW ENLIGHTENING IS ENLIGHTENED SHAREHOLDER VALUE? 
Just as debate continued on the precise intentions of the U.K. La-
bour government during the long period of the company law review pro-
cess, and throughout the drafting of the White Paper and subsequent 
Companies Act 2006, so too were the purpose and intentions of the Act 
keenly considered by the academic and legal community. One authority 
stated: 
The purpose behind s.172, within the framework just discussed, was 
primarily to emphasise the fact that directors should not run a com-
pany for short-term gains alone, but to take into account long-term 
consequences. The policy intention is to encourage decision-making 
based upon a longer-term perspective and not just immediate re-
turns. Also, the section, together with the Business Review (re-
quired by s.417 of the Act), was to make the process of manage-
ment more enlightened and it did this so as to ensure that directors 
would consider a much wider range of interests, with the hope that 
there would be more responsible decision-making.119 
However, the practical influence of the new legislation has proved 
modest compared to the ideals that inspired it. A survey of law firms at 
the time of legislation discovered that most were agnostic concerning 
whether § 172 might alter the outcomes of directors’ decisions in the 
course of doing business.120 Directors might have a new and more inclu-
sive duty enshrined in the Act, but they remained entirely immersed in a 
political economy of financial institutions, relationships, and expecta-
tions, which they normally feel impelled to respect. These influences 
continuously shape and form directors’ values and behavior, as Lipton, 
Mirvis, and Lorsch argue: 
Short-termism is a disease that infects American business and man-
agement and boardroom judgment. But it does not originate in the 	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boardroom. It is bred in the trading rooms of the hedge funds and 
professional institutional investment managers who control more 
than 75% of the shares of most major corporations.121 
Indeed it can be argued that the key players in corporate govern-
ance, the institutional investors and the executives and directors running 
the companies, are now so financially committed to the short term that 
there is little chance of § 172 changing their behavior, as Keay argues: 
While s.172 provides an entreaty, in s.172(1)(a), to manage whilst 
having regard for the long-term effects of an action, it is questiona-
ble whether it will in fact happen across the board. First, it is going 
to be difficult to enforce the long-term requirement, especially 
where directors resolutely maintain that they have acted in good 
faith. Second, managing for the long term is often antithetical to the 
interests of the company’s managers. Managers could favour the 
short term because they only have a temporary interest in the com-
pany, primarily limited to their time in the job. Managers get no or 
little benefit from planning for the long term as it is likely to be 
their successors who will receive the plaudits, and benefit from 
rents that come to the company under that approach. In fact plan-
ning for the long term could make the performance of today’s man-
agers look decidedly average, as the share price might not increase 
and higher dividends would not be paid as quickly as if short-term 
plans were implemented.122 
In this context (despite the high aspirations of some involved in the early 
work of revising U.K. company law), it is possible that § 172 and the 
accompanying business Review in § 417 of the Act, will amount to only 
a “self-serving and vacuous narrative rather than analytical material 
which is of genuine use.”123 
Redmond argues “we are at a stage where directors are permitted to 
take different stakeholder interests into account[,] but only to the point 
that this can be argued to be good for long-term shareholder wealth.”124 It 
would be hard for directors to make decisions that treat the well-being of 
employees or the environment as the primary cause for action (unless 
based on other legal obligations under employment or environmental 	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law).125 As Marshall and Ramsay state, “the extension of duties of direc-
tors has not been attended by the extension of rights for stakeholders.”126 
In fact, the U.K. revisions of directors’ duties have achieved little 
more than rebalancing the interpretation of directors duties back to the 
common law interpretation, before the shareholder primacy movement 
had caused a deeply flawed and unbalanced definition of directors’ duties 
to become salient. Meanwhile, the practical exigencies of running a 
company in highly a financialized market environment made it more dif-
ficult than ever to pursue the newly enlightened interpretation of direc-
tors duties in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. 
VIII. FINANCIALIZED AND DEHUMANIZED CORPORATIONS? 
A cruel paradox is that while we have been working back towards a 
broader and more inclusive definition of director duties, and corporations 
themselves have been at pains to profess newfound responsibilities, the 
practical realities of corporate existence and impact have often become 
starker. Financial imperatives have driven a relentless pursuit of share-
holder value, while the very concept has been exposed as narrow and 
damaging.127 This process of the cumulative financialization of econo-
mies, corporations, and society has been typified as encompassing: 
• The ascendancy of shareholder value as a mode of corporate 
governance; 
• The growing dominance of capital market financial systems 
over bank-based financial systems; 
• Significant increases in financial transactions, real interest 
rates, the profitability of financial firms, and the share of na-
tional income accruing to the holders of financial assets; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 125. Id. See also Bob Baxt, Future Directions for Corporate Law: Where Are We Now and 
Where Do We Go From Here? The Dilemmas of the Modern Company Director, 25 AUSTL. J. CORP. 
L. 216 (2011); Alice Klettner, Thomas Clarke & Michael Adams, The Changing Roles of Company 
Boards and Directors: The Impact of Legal Reform, 24 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 148 (2010); Shelley 
Marshall & Ian Ramsay, Stakeholders and Directors Duties: Law, Theory and Evidence, 18 UNSW 
L. J. 291; Ross W. Parsons, The Director’s Duty of Good Faith, 5 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 395 
(1967); Paul Redmond, The Reform of Directors’ Duties, 15 UNSW L. J. 86 (1992); Richard Wil-
liams, Enlightened Shareholder Value in UK Company Law, 18 UNSW L. J. 360 (2013). 
 126. Clarke, supra note 124, at 34 (quoting Marshall & Ramsay, supra note 125). 
 127. See Ronald Dore, Financialization of the Global Economy, 17 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 
1097 (2008). See also GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RE-SHAPED 
AMERICA (2009); G.R. KRIPPNER, CAPITALIZING ON CRISIS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE RISE 
OF FINANCE (2012) [hereinafter KRIPPNER, CRISIS]; G.R. Krippner, The Financialization of the 
American Economy, 3 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 173 (2005) [hereinafter Krippner, Economy]; N. van der 
Zwan, Making Sense of Financialization, 12 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 99 (2013). 
474 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:437 
• The increasing political and economic power of a particular 
class grouping: the rentier class for some;128 
• The explosion of financial trading with a myriad of new finan-
cial instruments; 
• A pattern of accumulation in which profit making occurs in-
creasingly through financial channels rather than through trade 
and commodity production;129 
• The increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, fi-
nancial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the 
domestic and international.130 
Multiple changes in the structural transformation of finance are oc-
curring at three levels: (1) financial markets and institutions increasingly 
displacing other sectors of the economy as the source of profitable activi-
ty; (2) the insistent financialization of nonfinancial corporations through 
a regime of maximizing shareholder value and the emphasis on financial 
metrics; and (3) the penetration of finance into every aspect of life as 
people are increasingly incorporated into financial activity. 131  For 
Krippner, the international expansion of financial markets and institu-
tions amounts to a new “pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue 
primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and com-
modity production.”132 The finance sector has progressively increased its 
share of GDP, and even for nonfinancial corporations, the pursuit of in-
terest, dividends, and capital gains outweigh any interest in productive 
investment. As nonfinancial corporations have become increasingly 
drawn into a financial paradigm, they have less capital available for pro-
ductive activity, despite increasing profits from financial activity.133 A 
combination of the accumulation of debt and the volatility of asset prices 
has increased systemic risk, leading to the increasing intensity of boom–
bust cycles. 
These financial pressures are translated into the operations of cor-
porations through the enveloping regime of maximizing shareholder val-
ue as the primary objective. Agency theory has provided the rationale for 
this project, prioritizing shareholders above all other participants in the 
corporation and focusing corporate managers on the release of share-	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holder value incentivized by their own stock options. In turn, this leads to 
an obsessive emphasis on financial performance measures, with increas-
ingly short-term business horizons. However, as financial gains are real-
ized they are not reinvested in advancing the corporation’s productive 
activity, but distributed to shareholders in dividend payments and share 
buybacks.134 While enriching executives and shareholders, corporations’ 
innovative and productive future is threatened by the increasing impact 
of financialization. 
Finally, the overwhelming embrace of finance is experienced in the 
increasing dependence of people on financial services and transactions in 
everyday life. The increasingly universal significance of defined contri-
bution superannuation schemes, property mortgages, credit cards, and 
mass-marketed financial services has created a world in which the appar-
ent “democratization of finance” has led to a convergence of finance and 
lifestyles.135 However, in contrast to the public welfare and savings re-
gimes of the past, which were intended to mitigate life cycle risks, the 
contemporary immersion in a profoundly financialized personal world 
acutely exposes individuals to the recurrent risks of the financial mar-
kets. This accumulation of an unrelenting international expansion of fi-
nancial markets, the insistent financialization of corporate objectives and 
values, and the subordination of whole populations to financial services 
exploded in the 2008 global financial crisis.136 
The impact of financialization is greatest among U.S. corporations 
and was highlighted by Michael Porter in his research for the U.S. Coun-
cil on Competitiveness.137 Porter explained that America failed to com-
pete effectively with European and Japanese corporations in the 1970s 
and 1980s, even in domestic markets, on the highly liquid but unstable 
U.S. financial markets, compared to the more stable finance and govern-
ance of their overseas competitors.138 Bill Lazonick has completed a se-
ries of major research programs on the myths of the market economy and 
the failure of U.S. capital markets to provide support for innovation in 
business in any sustainable way.139 Lazonick provides extensive evidence 
of four central elements driving the increasing financialization of U.S. 
corporations: (1) maximizing shareholder value; (2) the continuous pay-	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ment of high share dividends; (3) regular large scale share buy-backs by 
corporations; and (4) high executive stock options.140 
It was through a hollowing-out of the social responsibility of busi-
ness that the U.S. business corporation emerged as primarily a financial 
instrument. In this new financialized, dematerialized, and dehumanized 
corporate world, agency theory could be purveyed as the primary theo-
retical explanation, and shareholder value as the ultimate objective with 
impunity. In turn, these new conceptions of the theory and objective of 
the firm became vital ingredients in the further financialization of corpo-
rations, markets, and economies.141 Lazonick records how financializa-
tion had an impact upon the leading sectors of American industry: U.S. 
information technology companies, which led the world in 1990s innova-
tion (e.g., Microsoft, IBM, Cisco, Intel, Hewlett-Packard), “spent more 
(and except for Intel much more) on [stock] buybacks than they spent on 
R&D in 2000–2009.”142 
As nonfinancial corporations have become increasingly drawn into 
a financial paradigm, they have less capital available for productive ac-
tivity despite increasing profits from financial activity. A combination of 
the accumulation of debt and the volatility of asset prices has increased 
systemic risk, leading to the increasing intensity of boom–bust cycles.143 
These financial pressures are translated into the operations of corpora-
tions through the enveloping regime of maximizing shareholder value as 
the primary objective. Agency theory has provided the rationale for this 
project, prioritizing shareholders above all other participants in the cor-
poration, and focusing corporate managers on the release of shareholder 
value, incentivized by their own stock options. In turn, this leads to an 
obsessive emphasis on financial performance measures, with increasing-
ly short-term business horizons. However, as financial gains are realized, 
they are not reinvested in advancing the corporation’s productive activi-
ty, but distributed to shareholders in dividend payments and share buy-
backs.144 While enriching executives and shareholders, corporations’ in-
novative and productive future is threatened by the increasing impact of 
financialization. 
More critically, in the 2007–2008 global financial crisis: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 140. See Lazonick, Shareholder Value, supra note 54; Lazonick, Profits, supra note 53. 
 141. See Weinstein, supra note 5. 
 142. See Lazonick, Shareholder Value, supra note 54, at 490; William Lazonick, The Finan-
cialization of the U.S. Corporation: What Has Been Lost, and How It Can Be Regained, 36 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 875 (2013). 
 143. See Joachim Becker et al., Peripheral Financialization and Vulnerability to Crisis: A 
Regulationalist Perspective, 14 COMPETITION & CHANGE 225 (2010). 
 144. See Lazonick, Shareholder Value, supra note 54. 
2014] Legalizing Team Production Theory? 477 
The financial firms (Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, 
Wachovia, Washington Mutual, Fannie Mae, to name a few), many 
of whom failed, had previously used up precious reserves in order 
to fund stock buybacks, which in turn made already over-
compensated executives even wealthier. Why did senior executives 
willingly diminish the financial strength and resilience of major 
corporations in this reckless way?145 
IX. THE CONTINUING REVERBERATIONS OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 
The relentless search for returns, regardless of the consequences, 
embodied in the pursuit of shareholder value was at the heart of the caus-
es of the global financial crisis, and the continuing reverberations that are 
occurring. The self-interest and irresponsibility inherent in the practice of 
pursuing shareholder value reached its zenith with the reckless excesses 
of the global financial crisis. William Bratton and Michael Wachter re-
late the activities of financial sector firms in the years and months lead-
ing to the financial crisis of 2007–2008: 
For a management dedicated to maximizing share-holder value, the 
instruction manual was clear: get with the program by generating 
more risky loans and doing so with more leverage. Any bank whose 
managers failed to implement the [high-risk strategy] got stuck with 
a low stock price. . . . Unsurprisingly, its managers labored under 
considerable pressure to follow the strategies of competing banks.146 
The global financial crisis and its aftermath consisted of multiple 
and compounding failures in financial markets, institutions, regulation, 
and governance.147 The “animal spirits” unleashed in unfettered securi-
ties markets, massive incentivization of risk taking and leverage, and the 
abandonment of effective governance and ethical commitments occurred 	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in a regulatory vacuum. Governments were convinced that lightening the 
burden of regulation was the means to promote more dynamic financial 
markets and business development. The realization of the consequences 
of unchecked systemic risks has prompted national governments and in-
ternational agencies into a major series of regulatory reforms and inter-
ventions in financial markets and institutions, the effect of which remains 
to be discerned. 
At a conference of corporate lawyers, investors, and regulators at 
the Columbia University Millstein Center for Corporate Governance in 
June 2013, there were many indications that traction has not yet been 
achieved in the reform of the structure, orientations, and behavior of the 
international financial community.148 The U.S. investment banks (Strate-
gically Important Financial Institutions or “SIFIs”) have grown even 
larger since the financial crisis due to further consolidation in the indus-
try following the crisis. The enormous wave of regulation from the G20, 
Basel Bank of International Settlements, and the passage of Dodd–Frank 
in 2010 have not changed the banks in any substantial and meaningful 
way. The Wall Street banks are now larger and more remote than before, 
continue business as usual, and have not fundamentally changed their 
behavior, leading Elizabeth Warren, the campaigning U.S. Senator, to 
call for a twenty-first century Glass–Steagall Act to “ensure [the banks] 
are not too big to fail—or, for that matter, too big to manage, too big to 
regulate, too big for trial, or too big for jail.”149 
There is a profound paradox that after two decades of corporate 
governance reform, governments and corporations remain fully engaged 
in the governance challenges posed by the transformation of markets, 
operations, and technologies in the finance sector. “We have not yet fully 
understood the causes of the last financial crisis, and [have] not begun to 
prepare for the next one.”150 The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Act in 
the United States is still being implemented (828 pages, 398 rules, run-
ning to 14,000 pages, with every page being wrestled over by the lobby-
ists of the big banks).151 Though passage of the 882-page Volker Rule—
intended to update the 27-page Glass–Steagall Act—was achieved in 	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December 2013, separation of investment banking and retail banking 
(preventing banks from speculating with depositors funds, knowing the 
state will bail them out if they fail), remains in doubt. Justin O’Brien 
commented on this tortured legislative process: 
Ironically, flawed legislative framing, the complexity of Dodd–
Frank, and the glacial pace of implementation enable the very de-
fects in the financial sector regulation that legislators seek to reme-
dy. The Volcker Rule, which restricts proprietorial trading, is an 
obvious example. A clear rule has transmogrified into a complex 
implementation process, informed by waves of exceptions that un-
dercut legislative intent and undermine regulatory authority.152 
Any belief that the considerable efforts by government to rescue 
and reform financial institutions and markets would lead to sustained 
stability and security in the sector was rudely dispelled in a prolonged 
sequence of bank scandals and market failures in the years following the 
financial crisis. The banking crisis segued into a sovereign debt crisis in 
southern Europe with governments facing challenges in funding their 
activities. This was quickly followed by seismic eruptions in the main-
stream financial institutions with the revelations surrounding the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) rate fixing. A total of $10 trillion in 
loans and $350 trillion in derivatives worldwide were indexed to 
LIBOR.153 The U.S. Financial Stability Oversight Council (established 
by the Dodd–Frank Act to identify risks to financial stability, promote 
market discipline, and respond to emerging threats) highlighted: 
Recent investigations uncovered systemic false reporting and ma-
nipulations of reference rate submissions dating back many years. 
This misconduct was designed to either increase the potential profit 
of the submitting firms or to convey a misleading picture of the 
relative health of the submitting banks. These actions were perva-
sive, occurred in multiple bank locations around the world, involved 
senior bank officials at several banks, and affected multiple bench-
mark rates and currencies, including LIBOR, EURIBOR, and the 
Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate (TIBOR). Each of the banks that 
faced charges engaged in a multi-year pattern of misconduct that 
involved collusion with other banks.154 
This rate manipulation predated the crisis and had continued long 
after the government support and intervention in the banking sector fol-	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lowing the financial crisis, revealing how constricted any ostensible 
change in governance and ethics within the banks actually was. After a 
major inquiry into Barclay’s involvement in the LIBOR rate-rigging, 
subpoenas to JPMorgan, Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland Group, 
HSBC, Citigroup, and UBS, all of the banks settled for fines amounting 
to billions of dollars with the Department of Justice and Commodities 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in the United States and the Finan-
cial Services Authority (FSA) in the United Kingdom. The Salz Review 
on Barclay’s exposed the “gaps between Barclay’s publicly articulated 
values and its business practices.”155 Antony Jenkins, the new CEO of 
Barclays, admitted in the 2012 Annual Report: “For the past 30 years, 
banking has been progressively too aggressive, too focused on the short 
term, too disconnected from the needs of our customers and clients, and 
wider society and we lost our way.”156 The U.K. Parliamentary Commis-
sion on Banking Standards stated: “Too many bankers, especially at the 
most senior levels, have operated in an environment with insufficient 
personal responsibility,” and “[r]emuneration has incentivised miscon-
duct and excessive risk-taking, reinforcing a culture where poor stand-
ards were often considered normal.”157 
X. VALUE FOR ALL PARTIES? 
As Margaret Blair contends, in the United States, directors have 
both the authority and the responsibility, without any change in corporate 
law, to consider the interests of all of the participants in the corporate 
enterprise in order to try to find the outcome that creates value for all 
parties.158 However, this responsibility is confounded by the realities of 
corporate practice. Take, for example, the recent experience of Apple, 
currently the most successful corporation in the United States in terms of 
market capitalization, revenues, product design, and brand. In 2013, Ap-
ple possessed in excess of $140 billion in cash and liquid assets, proba-
bly the greatest hoard of any corporation in history (accumulated on the 
backs of over 1 million Chinese workers in assembly plants often de-
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prived of pay, and frequently deprived of sleep, while Apple maintained 
up to 40% returns while holding down costs on its supplier Foxconn159). 
Meanwhile, in response to pressure from the New York-based 
Greenlight hedge fund, Apple agreed to disburse dividend payments of 
$100 billion over the following three years, and subsequently, under 
pressure from the hedge fund raider Carl Icahn, Apple further increased 
this proposal for a massive disbursement of funds to shareholders (with-
out any further commitment, other than those which had secured only 
modest improvements, to remedying Apple’s appalling record of labor 
standards in China). When the CEO of Apple, Tim Cook, was hauled 
before the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations to 
explain the systemic avoidance of corporation tax by Apple and other 
U.S. corporations by parking tens of billions in overseas tax havens ra-
ther than repatriating the funds, his response was to call for a tax holiday 
to enable corporations to return their profits at a fraction of the standard 
corporate tax rate.160 This did not enamor the Senate since there was sig-
nificant evidence that previous tax holidays for U.S. corporations had not 
seen the funds utilized for business and employment development, but in 
paying dividends, share buybacks, executive stock options, and paying 
down debt.161 This is the result of pursuing the logic of shareholder pri-
macy and the discipline of shareholder value through global value chains 
to factories in emerging economies. Even the most successful corpora-
tion neglects the labor standards of a million young workers—and avoids 
paying taxes—while disbursing hundreds of billions of dollars to share-
holders, and in the process loses much of the capacity to invest in inno-
vation, and the design and development of new product technologies and 
new production processes. 
Yet, while engaging in a considered way in this consistently irre-
sponsible behavior, boards of directors of U.S. corporations clearly be-
lieve they are carrying out their duties as prescribed by corporations law, 
and are indeed legally constrained to do this. In fact, there is no reference 
to any duty to deliver shareholder value in U.S. corporate law, or in the 
corporate law of any other country.162 Corporate law around the world 
sensibly states that it is the duty of directors to pursue the best interests 	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of the company, and it is this interpretation that has been sustained in 
common law in many significant judgments in the courts.163 However, 
though this may refer to the general body of shareholders over time, 
there is no injunction upon directors to pursue the immediate interests of 
shareholders, or the interests of particular shareholders. Nor are directors 
prevented from taking into account the interests of other stakeholders in 
the company. In fact, the translation of shareholder rights into property 
rights by the agency theorists is quite bogus, since shareholders do not 
“possess” any of the assets of the company (which are owned by the 
company). All shareholders possess are their shares, which give them 
certain rights, such as attendance at the annual general meeting, voting 
for directors, and receipt of dividends, but in no other sense allow any 
form of “control” over the company.164 
XI. THE IMPACT OF SHORT-TERMISM AND IMPATIENT CAPITAL 
In this context of the continuing ascendancy of shareholder value, 
and aggressive short-termism, the U.K. Kay Review was called to exam-
ine the mechanisms of corporate control and accountability provided by 
U.K. equity markets, and their impact on the long term competitive per-
formance of U.K. businesses, and to make recommendations. Specifical-
ly, it was tasked to inquire into whether the timescales considered by 
boards and senior management in evaluating corporate risks and oppor-
tunities, and by institutional shareholders and asset managers in making 
investment and governance decisions, and match the time horizons of the 
underlying beneficiaries. Furthermore, it was to consider whether the 
current functioning of equity markets gives sufficient encouragement to 
boards to focus on the long-term development of their business. In the 
Interim Report of the Review, Kay commented: 
We heard many references to the merits of liquidity, transparency, 
price discovery, and other intermediate objectives. While these ob-
jectives may be desirable, they are not achieved without cost, and 
must find their justification in the contribution they make to the 
fundamental goals of high performing companies and good risk ad-
justed returns for savers. Many respondents to this Review thought 
that equity markets have lost sight of these goals. For example, the 
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) observed 	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that “it is sometimes forgotten that equity markets exist not solely to 
enrich speculators, market makers and intermediaries . . . . It would 
seem fair to say that equity markets today serve the needs of the 
players in these markets better than they serve either those who put 
up the money or the businesses wanting finance to support 
growth.”165 
Kay analyzed this distinction between short-term trading and long-term 
investing. High-frequency traders are driven by short-term market trends 
and turn their portfolios over rapidly. Underlying performance is of less 
interest than immediate opportunity. In contrast, investors intent on hold-
ing assets for the long term will analyze a company’s prospects and un-
derlying performance. Kay concludes: “Equity markets work effectively 
for the corporate sector when they encourage, and do not impede, deci-
sion making which enhances the long term competitive capabilities of the 
business.”166 Yet recent advances in financial, computing, and communi-
cations technologies have facilitated the dramatic reduction of the aver-
age holding period of equity; on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
this has diminished from seven years in the 1950s to six months today.167 
More worryingly, as much as 70% of trading volume on the NYSE is 
performed by computer driven algorithms and is measured in millisec-
onds, and other exchanges are similarly overwhelmed.168 The concern is 
that the short-term emphasis of equity markets may have further intensi-
fied unproductive value extraction at the expense of sustainable value 
creation. 
The more impact short-term traders have in the market, the more 
volatile prices will be. Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England has doc-
umented this phenomenon, citing a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) 
2006 Symposium, which concluded: “The obsession with short-term re-
sults by investors, asset management firms, and corporate managers col-
lectively leads to the unintended consequences of destroying long-term 
value, decreasing market efficiency, reducing investment returns, and 
impeding efforts to strengthen corporate governance.”169 Indeed it can be 
argued that the key players in corporate governance, the institutional in-
vestors and the executives and directors running companies, are now so 	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financially committed to the short term that there is little chance § 172 of 
the U.K. Corporation Act, or any similar legislation in other countries, 
changing their behavior. 
In this context, despite the high aspirations of some involved in the 
early work of revising U.K. company law, it is possible that § 172 and 
the accompanying business review in § 417 of the Act will simply 
amount to a directors’ commentary that is a “self-serving and vacuous 
narrative rather than analytical material which is of genuine use.”170 Yet 
long-term innovation and investment performance requires attention to 
more than short-term financial metrics, and there are other critical and 
pressing reasons why corporations are now required to become more 
long-sighted and expansive in their purpose. 
XII. IN SEARCH OF SUSTAINABILITY AND PATIENT CAPITAL 
In their analysis of team production, Blair and Stout (unlike agency 
theorists) explicitly acknowledge the significance of external political 
influences upon the direction of corporations to which they must re-
spond: 
A second lesson to draw from team production theory concerns the 
fundamentally political nature of the corporation. Scholarly and 
popular debates about corporate governance need to recognize that 
corporations mediate among the competing interests of various 
groups and individuals that risk firm-specific investments in a joint 
enterprise. . . . Thus, future scholarship should explore in greater de-
tail the internal and external political and economic pressures that 
affect the decision making process in firms.171 
The greatest and most imminent pressure upon businesses of this 
era is the demand for corporate social and environmental responsibility 
(CSR) in a severely resource constrained planet. The business imperative 
for sustainability is becoming increasingly unavoidable. However chal-
lenging the prospects, there are growing indications of large corporations 
taking their social and environmental responsibilities more seriously. 
Furthermore, these issues becoming more critical in the business agenda 
and are being taken up as part of the duties of company directors.172 This 
is a consequence of several factors: technological advances such as social 
media make it much easier to find out about companies and broadcast 
any misdemeanors; maintaining a good reputation is a vital asset for 	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many companies; civil society groups have become more vocal regarding 
companies’ public responsibilities; and some of the protections formerly 
offered by law have been eroded. The substance of company reports is 
changing, from purely environmental reporting up until the late 1990s, to 
sustainability reporting (social, environmental, and economic), which has 
become the mainstream approach of global companies. 173 
At the confluence of these multiple emerging initiatives and trends 
towards greater corporate social and environmental responsibility, there 
is emerging a dynamic stakeholder model for driving what is still often 
referred to as “enlightened shareholder value” (or more expansively, 
stakeholder values).174 This enlightened shareholder value approach pos-
its that there can be a win-win situation whereby a company will benefit 
financially in the long term if it behaves responsibly towards its employ-
ees, the environment, customers, suppliers, and other stakeholders. The 
obvious manifestations of this are reputational benefits, reduced costs 
from more efficient use of natural resources, and the support of local 
communities (“the license to operate”). Critics of this view maintain that 
there will be circumstances where the win-win scenario is simply not 
possible or is too costly; not all companies are concerned with reputation, 
and the benefits from bad behavior can be all too tempting. A business 
case for corporate responsibility may exist for some companies but not 
for all. Indeed, Vogel, in discussing the limits of CSR, comments that it 
should be understood as “a niche rather than a generic strategy.”175 
Many advances in international CSR policy and practice have oc-
curred in recent years. For example: the further development of the Unit-
ed Nations Environment Programme Financial Initiative (“UNEP FI”), 
linking environmental, social, and governance issues to company value, 
has persuasively argued the relationship between sustainability and valu-
ation;176 the UNEP FI Principles of Responsible Investment has recruited 
1,287 investment institutions as signatories of the principles, with assets 
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under management of approximately US$45 trillion;177 the Global Re-
porting Initiative (GRI) has been adopted worldwide by major corpora-
tions as a means of integrated reporting;178 and the London Stock Ex-
change (LSE) has recently joined a U.N.-coordinated Sustainable Stock 
Exchanges (SSE) initiative aimed at exploring how exchanges can work 
together with investors, regulators, and companies to enhance corporate 
transparency and ultimately performance on ESG (environmental, social, 
and corporate governance) issues.179 
Together with many other international, national, and private sector 
initiatives, the knowledge about sustainability and sophisticated policies 
of corporate sustainability and social responsibility have gained global 
significance. However, significant questions remain—to what degree 
have these policies, however refined, become embedded in the govern-
ance processes of corporations? Have these policies had an impact on 
fundamental business models? How effectively have the policies been 
implemented in practice? One extensive survey offers sobering answers 
to these questions: 
Corporations that have grasped the importance of sustainability in 
the value creation process and the necessity for innovation in prod-
ucts, processes, and business models have made the first important 
step towards a sustainable strategy. However, realization on its own 
is not enough if it is not followed by implementation. To enable in-
novation and make sustainability considerations core to a compa-
ny’s strategy and operations, a company needs to have a governance 
structure and process that is supportive of developing and executing 
a sustainable strategy. . . . Corporate governance has a key role in 
the implementation of a sustainable strategy as the board of a firm is 
responsible for setting the overall direction and creating the appro-
priate systems that will facilitate it . . . . By examining archival data 
on how many firms embrace this approach today, we have found 
that the governance of sustainability is still at an embryonic stage.180 
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Recent research offers a different view, revealing that many large 
Australian companies have a board subcommittee dedicated to consider-
ing issues of corporate responsibility and sustainability. Of the ASX 50 
companies surveyed, twenty-two disclosed that they had a board commit-
tee dedicated to sustainability, six had a dedicated senior executive 
committee, and three reported they had a dedicated network of manag-
ers.181 They have formal processes for engaging with their stakeholders, 
and systems for ensuring that stakeholder interests are taken into account 
at the highest levels of decisionmaking. Formal governance structures are 
being put in place to ensure that sustainability initiatives are integrated 
into core business strategy. Moreover, tentative steps are being made by 
a significant number of large international corporations towards integrat-
ed reporting. The prototype integrated reporting framework encourages 
companies to report in relation to a broad range of “capitals” or resources 
used and created by the organization. These include the traditional focus: 
financial capital, but also manufactured capital, human capital, intellec-
tual capital, natural capital, and relationship (or social) capital.182 In their 
2008 survey, KPMG found that only 4% of the 250 largest global com-
panies had experimented with some form of integrated reporting, where-
as in 2011, the percentage had risen to 26%.183 Although companies are 
attempting to integrate their reporting, in the majority of cases this in-
volves a dedicated section in the annual report rather than truly combined 
performance reporting, suggesting that integrated reporting is still in an 
experimental stage.184 
However, both the operating and reporting environment for corpo-
rations is about to change radically as the implications of the sustainabil-
ity imperative become fully apparent: 
Over the next 20 years there is likely to be increasing pressure for 
the price of resources, products and services to reflect the full cost 
of their production including the cost of environmental impacts. 
Such pressure is likely to grow as governments address the effects 
of sustainability mega-forces. Possible futures include the removal 
of subsidies on input commodities (such as fossil fuels and water) 
and the wider introduction of mechanisms to increase the cost of 	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environmentally damaging outputs. It is therefore prudent for com-
panies to expect to pay in the future a rising proportion of their ex-
ternal environmental costs which today are often not shown on fi-
nancial statements.185 
Coming to terms with the real cost of the natural capital of the earth 
they have freely exploited will induce a profound transformation upon 
business thinking and practice. Trucost is a research body established by 
several U.K. financial institutions to estimate in monetary terms 
the financial risk from unpriced natural capital inputs to production, 
across business sectors at a regional level. By using an environmen-
tally extended input-output model (EEIO), it also estimates, at a 
high level, how these may flow through global supply chains to 
producers of consumer goods. It demonstrates that some business 
activities do not generate sufficient profit to cover their natural re-
source use and pollution costs. However, businesses and investors 
can take account of natural capital costs in decision making to man-
age risk and gain competitive advantage. Natural capital assets fall 
into two categories: those which are non-renewable and traded, such 
as fossil fuel and mineral “commodities”; and those which provide 
finite renewable goods and services for which no price typically ex-
ists, such as clean air, groundwater and biodiversity.186 
Business is now faced with the greatest political and social chal-
lenge ever: how to stop the continuous and cumulative environmental 
despoliation of the planet before we reach the point of ecological disas-
ter. Since the time of the industrial revolution, industry has been deeply 
implicated in the emissions that have contributed to global warming, and 
now must be central to the achievement of zero carbon emissions and 
sustainable business enterprise. Tackling this challenge will necessitate a 
fundamental revision of corporate purpose, corporate governance, and 
directors’ duties. How can we have confidence that this will be accom-
plished when so little has been achieved in the reformulation and en-
lightenment of directors’ duties after decades of effort up to this point? 
The answer is that we are now in the position of: 
• Confronting an environmental and social challenge that is a 
universal problem unprecedented in human civilization; 
• This is an urgent challenge and cannot be deferred or delayed;  	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• Corporations are a vital means to the solution of sustainability, 
but every other level of the economy and society will be in-
volved including intergovernmental agencies, national govern-
ments, civil society, and people. 
No less a person than Henry Paulson, Secretary of the Treasury un-
der George W. Bush, and the architect of the vast U.S. rescue package 
during the global financial crisis, recently has called upon fellow Repub-
licans to face up to their environmental responsibilities: 
I was Secretary of the US Treasury when the credit bubble burst, so 
I think it is fair to say that I know a little bit about risk, assessing 
outcomes and problem-solving. Looking back at the dark days of 
the financial crisis in 2008, it is easy to see the similarities between 
the financial crisis and the climate challenge we now face. We are 
building up excesses (debt in 2008, greenhouse gas emissions that 
are trapping heat now). Our government policies are flawed (incen-
tives for us to borrow too to finance homes then and encouraging 
the overuse of carbon-based fuels now) . . . . And the outsize risks 
have the potential to be tremendously damaging (to a globalized 
economy then and the global climate now). Back then we narrowly 
avoided an economic catastrophe at the last minute by rescuing a 
collapsing financial system through government action. But climate 
change is a more intractable problem. The carbon dioxide we’re 
sending into the atmosphere remains there for centuries heating the 
planet.187 
In response to conservative critics who highlight the high price of inter-
vention, Paulson argues: 
Our failure to act on the underlying problem is deeply misguided, 
financially and logically. In a future with more severe storms, long-
er fire seasons, and rising seas that imperil coastal cities, public 
funding to pay for adaptations or disaster relief will add significant-
ly to our fiscal deficit and threaten our long-term economic securi-
ty. . . . A tax on carbon emissions will unleash a wave of innovation 
to develop technologies, lower the costs of clean energy and create 
jobs as we and other nations develop new energy products and in-
frastructure.188 
Over the next twenty years businesses will be exposed to hundreds 
of environmental and social changes that will bring both risks and oppor-
tunities in the search for sustainable growth: 	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• Climate Change 
• Volatile Fossil Fuel Markets 
• Material Resource Scarcity 
• Water Scarcity 
• Population Growth 
• Impact on Resources of Growing Global Middle Class 
• Growing Urbanisation 
• Food Security 
• Ecosystem Decline 
• Deforestation189 
This is all a long way from the simplistic tenets of shareholder val-
ue, and the narrow objective it focused upon, often to the detriment of 
corporations, shareholders, stakeholders, and the wider economy and 
environment. Hopefully we can now spend more time addressing the 
possibilities and limitations of corporate social and environmental re-
sponsibility, free of the dead weight of the mythology of shareholder 
primacy. To tackle these compounding problems, corporations will be 
required to engage in a sustainable revolution just as profound as the in-
dustrial revolution in which we will move from a nineteenth century fo-
cus on production, and a twentieth century focus on marketing and con-
sumption, to a twenty-first century focus on sustainability. But the inte-
gration of corporate governance and sustainability is still to be achieved: 
while corporate policy has become more sophisticated, implementation 
remains in its infancy. The reformulation of corporate purpose, corporate 
governance and directors’ duties in the direction of greater environmen-
tal and social responsibility is now a matter of survival. 
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